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Long	Read	Review:	Turkey’s	July	15th	Coup:	What
Happened	and	Why	edited	by	M.	Hakan	Yavuz	and
Bayram	Balci
Two	years	after	the	event,	the	collection	Turkey’s	July	15th	Coup:	What	Happened	and	Why,	edited	by	M.	Hakan
Yavuz	and	Bayram	Balci,	brings	together	contributors	to	unpack	the	historical,	political,	religious	and	ideological
dimensions	of	the	2016	coup	attempt	in	Turkey.	The	volume	offers	insightful	historical	insight	into	the
deteriorating	relationship	between	AKP	leader	and	President	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan	and	the	Gülen	movement	and
its	ultimate	impact	on	the	events	of	15	July	2016,	writes	Serhun	Al.
Turkey’s	July	15th	Coup:	What	Happened	and	Why.	M.	Hakan	Yavuz	and	Bayram	Balci	(eds).	University	of
Utah	Press.	2018.
Find	this	book:	
Political	and	cultural	institutions	of	the	modern	Turkish	Republic	(established	1923)
were	mostly	built	by	a	small	group	of	political	elites	with	strong	military	careers	under
the	undisputed	leadership	of	Mustafa	Kemal	and	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	secular
and	Western-style	nation	state.	This	was	based	on	Western	modernity	as	opposed	to
the	Islamic	and	imperial	character	of	the	archaic	Ottoman	state	(1299-1922).	Under
the	secular	Republic,	Islamic	groups	mostly	became	an	oppositional	community	and
the	competitor	against	the	new	state.
Moreover,	this	new	state	and	nation-building	were	mostly	engineered	under	and	in
parallel	to	the	making	of	a	strong	and	secular	Turkish	military.	Thus,	the	modern
Republic	itself	is	a	reflection	of	a	nationalised	military	and	a	militarised	nation	within
which	the	primary	duty	of	all	citizens	has	been	to	serve,	protect	and	survive	the	state.
The	almost-hysterical	psychology	of	the	latter	is	of	course	an	outcome	of	the
traumatic,	humiliating	and	depressing	dissolution	of	the	once-glorious	Ottoman	Empire
at	the	hands	of	domestic	and	external	destabilising	forces.
That	is	why	the	Turkish	military	under	the	Republic	was	always	determined	to	prevent	a	similar	catastrophe	along
with	the	protection	of	the	Kemalist	character	of	the	new	state.	Within	this	context,	Turkish	politics	in	the	second	half
of	the	twentieth	century	was	subject	to	various	military	interventions	and	coups	(in	1960,	1971,	1980	and	1997).	The
communist	and	Islamic	threats	were	the	major	factors	that	led	to	such	interventions.	Interestingly,	the	ultimate	goal	of
the	Turkish	military	was	never	to	be	the	government	itself,	but	rather	to	‘correct’	the	civilian	government	practices	that
would	jeopardise	the	survival	of	the	nationalist	and	secular	character	of	the	state.	Thus,	transition	to	civilian	politics
after	military	interventions	was	always	imminent—very	different	from	the	military	coup	culture	in	Latin	America	or
Africa,	for	instance.	Yet,	military	tutelage	and	democratisation	in	Turkey	have	still	been	conflicting	forces.
The	secular	Kemalist	establishment	first	significantly	began	to	shatter	with	a	new	hegemonic	political	actor	in	Turkish
politics	after	2002:	namely,	the	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP)	under	the	leadership	of	Recep	Tayyip
Erdoğan,	a	pious	Muslim	with	a	political	Islam	background.	AKP	came	to	power	by	winning	elections	with	a	majority
vote	in	2002	and	has	remained	the	single-party	government	since	then	with	its	blend	of	social	conservatism,	Islamic
piety	and	economic	liberalism.
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Behind	the	scenes,	perhaps	the	most	critical	ally	of	Erdoğan	in	this	process	was	Fethullah	Gülen,	the	self-exiled
religious	cleric	in	the	US	who	leads	the	so-called	Hizmet	(Service)	or	Gülen	movement,	a	global	Islamic	network	of
education,	business	and	media	allegedly	dedicated	to	raising	a	pious	Muslim	generation	with	emphasis	on	science,
Islamic	ethics	and	the	market	economy.	This	alliance	was	mostly	based	on	mutual	interests	rather	than	a	principled
stance	against	the	secular	Kemalist	establishment	across	the	military,	judiciary	and	other	key	state	institutions.
Thanks	to	this	strong	alliance,	Erdoğan’s	rule	showed	resistance	to	the	2007	e-memorandum	issued	by	the	military
against	the	presidential	candidacy	of	Abdullah	Gül,	now	an	ex-comrade	of	Erdoğan,	who	also	survived	a	party
closure	case	by	the	Constitutional	Court	in	2008	based	on	charges	of	religious	reactionism.	Under	the	AKP
governments,	the	bureaucracy	and	state	institutions	were	mostly	filled	with	pro-Gülen	cadres	who	neutralised	the
secular	Kemalist	military	officers	and	bureaucrats	through	the	Ergenekon	(2007)	and	Sledgehammer	(2010)	trials	on
the	basis	of	alleged	coup	attempts	against	the	democratically	elected	Erdoğan	government.	When	one	investigates
these	trials	today,	it	turns	out	most	of	the	accusations	were	based	on	fabricated	evidence	by	pro-Gülen	police
officers	and	state	prosecutors.
When	AKP	won	the	2011	general	elections	with	almost	50	per	cent	of	the	total	votes,	many	believed	that	this	was	a
victory	against	the	military	tutelage	and	that	the	era	of	military	coups	was	over	in	Turkey.	This	is	perhaps	why	no	one
in	Turkey	was	expecting	the	15	July	military	coup	attempt	in	2016—a	traumatising	shock	to	the	whole	nation.
However,	the	nature	of	this	failed	intervention,	which	led	to	the	death	of	272	people,	was	a	completely	different	story
compared	to	previous	Turkish	military	interventions	in	the	twentieth	century.	15	July	was	the	outcome	and	peak	point
of	a	conflict	and	rivalry	between	old	allies/new	foes	within	the	Islamic	community	itself:	namely,	Erdoğan	and	his	AKP
versus	Fethullah	Gülen	and	his	so-called	Gülen	movement.
Image	Credit:	Anti-coup	protesters	after	15	July	2016	Turkish	coup	d’état	attempt	in	Bağcılar,	İstanbul,	Turkey	(Maurice	Flesier	CC
BY	SA	4.0)
Turkey’s	July	15th	Coup:	What	Happened	and	Why,	edited	by	M.	Hakan	Yavuz	and	Bayram	Balci,	unpacks	the
historical,	political,	religious	and	ideological	dimensions	of	this	coup	attempt.	It	provides	a	holistic	perspective	on
why,	how	and	under	what	conditions	the	relationship	between	Erdoğan	and	Gülen	transformed	from	an	invisible
alliance	after	2002	to	an	all-out	conflict	from	2013,	which	ultimately	led	to	the	15	July	coup	in	2016.	Despite
skepticism	in	the	international	community,	editors	Yavuz	and	Balci	as	well	as	the	contributors	all	agree	without	a
doubt	that	15	July	was	administered	and	masterminded	by	Gülenist	circles	within	the	military.	Therefore,	the	book
mostly	rejects	the	allegations	that	15	July	was	a	‘Hollywood	production’	by	Erdoğan	to	strengthen	his	grip	on	power.
In	Chapter	One,	Yavuz	explains	the	transformation	of	the	Gülen	movement	from	a	pietistic	Muslim	community	in	the
1970s	to	a	movement	with	global	media,	education	and	business	networks	in	the	1990s,	before	becoming	a
politically	motivated	religious-ideological	structure	in	the	2000s	aimed	at	controlling	the	state.	In	this	regard,	Yavuz
argues	that	the	police	in	Turkey	became	fully	under	the	control	of	Gülenist	circles	by	2007	and	the	judiciary	by	2010.
Yavuz	also	reveals	how	Gülen	was	mostly	distant	from	other	major	Islamic	groups	in	Turkey,	such	as	Necmettin
Erbakan’s	Welfare	Party	and	the	National	Outlook	Movement,	for	ideological	and	strategic	reasons.
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For	Yavuz,	Gülen	is	a	political	strategist	who	tends	to	see	the	Turkish	state	as	being	as	sacred	as	Islam	and	thus
perceives	and	embraces	Turkish	nationalism	as	mutually	constitutive	with	an	Islamic	worldview.	This	is	why	Gülen’s
pro-state	tendencies	in	the	1990s	made	him	closer	to	centre-right	political	parties	rather	than	political	Islamist	groups
such	as	Erbakan’s	that	had	more	anti-establishment	and	pro-ummah	political	views.	Although	Erdoğan	was	a	student
of	Erbakan	and	came	from	the	National	Outlook	tradition,	his	mutual	interests	with	the	Gülen	movement	—	namely,	a
fear	of	military	persecution	and	a	desire	to	escape	the	political	pressures	of	the	secular	establishment	—	brought
them	into	a	strategic	alliance	to	transform	state	institutions.	However,	they	were	also	competing	for	the	same	state
resources	and	unwilling	to	share	power	with	each	other.	Thus,	the	clash	of	Turkey’s	two	most	prevalent	Islamic
movements	was	inevitable,	Yavuz	argues.
In	Chapter	Two,	Mujeeb	R.	Khan	reviews	how	Gülenist	circles	gradually	infiltrated	state	institutions	in	the	2000s.	In
Chapter	Three,	Yavuz	and	Rasim	Koc	unpack	the	reasons	behind	the	clash	between	Erdoğan	and	Gülen	based	on
their	ideological	differences.	For	instance,	while	Erdoğan	and	AKP	mostly	embraced	pro-Palestinian	and	pro-Muslim
Brotherhood	views	along	with	potential	reconciliation	with	Iran,	Gülen	has	been	pro-Israel	and	anti-Iranian	due	to	the
movement’s	headquarters	being	based	in	the	United	States.	Gülenist	policy-making	is	closer	to	American
neoconservatives	and	Saudi	Wahabis	in	terms	of	undermining	the	anti-Western	political	Islamist	movements	in	the
region,	most	particularly	the	Muslim	Brotherhood.	In	fact,	if	one	traces	the	first	dispute	between	Erdoğan	and	Gülen,
one	may	point	to	the	Davos	incident	in	2009,	where	Erdoğan	publicly	accused	the	late	Israeli	President	Shimon
Peres	of	being	a	murderer	of	Palestinians.	Erdoğan’s	open	anti-Israeli	opposition	put	the	Gülen	movement	in	the
United	States	in	a	tough	spot.	After	the	9/11	attacks,	the	Gülen	movement	was	seeking	to	become	the	symbol	of
‘good	Muslims’,	Western-friendly	and	pro-democracy	in	the	eyes	of	the	American	bureaucracy	and	public.	Any	anti-
Western	and	anti-Israeli	move	by	Erdoğan	in	Turkey	hurt	the	Gülenists’	desired	public	image	in	the	West.
Image	Credit:	Grand	National	Assembly,	Turkey,	following	15	July	coup	attempt,	taken	in	August	2016	during	tour	by	Marine	Gen.
Joseph	F.	Dunford	Jr.,	chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	(DoD	Photo	by	Navy	Petty	Officer	2nd	Class	Dominique	A.	Pineiro,
Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	Flickr	account	CC	BY	2.0)
In	Chapter	Five,	Kilic	Kanat	compares	and	contrasts	the	military	coups	and	interventions	in	Turkish	politics	and
argues	that	what	the	coup	plotters	miscalculated	on	15	July	was	the	reaction	of	civilians.	In	Chapter	Six,	Caroline
Tee	analyses	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	Turkish-Islamic	alliance	between	the	Gülen	movement	and	AKP.	While	she
argues	that	social	conservatism,	religious	piety	and	economic	liberalism	are	key	common	characteristics	of	the	two
groups,	the	Davos	incident	(2009),	the	Gaza	flotilla	raid	by	Israeli	military	against	the	Turkish-owned	Mavi	Marmara
(2010)	and	the	Oslo	talks	with	the	PKK	(Kurdistan	Workers’	Party)	(2012)	gradually	deteriorated	Erdoğan-Gülen
relations.	Erdoğan’s	first	retaliation	against	the	Gülen	movement	was	his	2012	move	to	shut	down	university
preparation	schools	(dershane),	which	were	the	recruiting	and	indirect	indoctrination	sites	for	the	Gülenists.
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In	Chapter	Seven,	Sabine	Dreher	argues	that	the	Gülen	movement	is	an	elite-oriented	religious	revival	movement
that	promotes	neoliberalism	within	its	own	understanding	of	globalisation	based	on	education	in	private	schools,
business	networks	and	intercultural	dialogue.	But	she	argues	that	making	Turkey	and	Turkish	Islam	the	premier	of
the	market	economy	in	the	Muslim	world	has	been	the	main	national	dimension	in	the	worldview	of	the	movement.
In	Chapter	Eight,	Balci	provides	a	historical	account	of	the	Gülen	movement’s	expansion	in	the	post-Soviet	political
space,	including	the	Balkans,	the	Caucasus	and	Central	Asia.	Balci	argues	that	the	Turkic	nature	of	these	areas
contributed	to	the	movement’s	choice	of	operations.	After	the	conflict	began	between	Erdoğan	and	Gülen,	Ankara
demanded	the	abolition	of	Gülenist	activities	in	many	countries	in	these	territories:	for	instance,	Gülenists	are
criminalised	in	Uzbekistan	and	Turkmenistan,	though	they	are	still	active	in	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,
according	to	Balci.	In	Chapter	Nine,	David	Tittensor	analyses	the	Gülen	movement’s	relationship	with	academics	in
the	West	and	argues	that	it	has	tried	to	promote	a	pluralist	self-image	despite	its	secretive	and	hierarchical	inner
organisational	structure.	Thus,	he	argues	that	academics	need	to	be	cautious	when	they	study	large	and	powerful
organisations	in	Turkey	and	elsewhere.
In	Chapter	Ten,	Yavuz	Cobanoglu	introduces	perhaps	one	of	the	few	studies	on	the	role	of	women	in	the	Gülen
movement.	Based	on	a	survey	study	with	women	who	stay	in	Gülen	dormitories	in	Tunceli,	Cobanoglu	reflects	on
how	the	movement	is	inherently	patriarchal,	hierarchical	and	authoritarian	in	nature.	Women	can	be	teachers,
organisers,	fundraisers	and	elder	sisters	(abla)	in	dormitories,	but	they	can	never	become	part	of	the	core	decision-
making	circle	at	the	top	of	the	movement.
In	Chapter	Eleven,	Kristina	Dohen	analyses	the	post-coup	attempt	future	of	the	Gülen	movement,	with	a	case	study
of	Gülen	schools	in	Tanzania.	She	argues	that	since	the	activity	and	image	of	the	movement	in	Turkey	has	mostly
collapsed,	they	may	have	to	rely	on	non-Turkish	members	for	its	global	survival.	To	do	this,	Gülenists	may	need	a
revised	ideology	beyond	a	Turkish-Islamic	synthesis.	In	Chapter	Twelve,	Joshua	Hendrick	argues	that	the	US	policy
of	finding	a	model	of	‘good	Islam’	in	the	aftermath	of	the	9/11	attacks	has	also	led	to	the	expansion	and	spread	of
the	Gülen	movement	worldwide.
Overall,	this	edited	volume	offers	three	major	arguments.	First,	the	15	July	coup	attempt	was	a	Gülenist	job.	Second,
despite	the	public	relations	promotion	of	the	movement	as	a	pluralist	and	democratic	organisation,	the	Gülen
movement’s	inner	circles	are	highly	hierarchical,	secretive	and	patriarchal.	Third,	the	infiltration	of	the	Gülenists	in	the
top	cadres	of	the	state	institutions	in	Turkey	was	mostly	encouraged	by	the	AKP	governments	between	2002	and
2011.
The	book	offers	an	insightful	historical	account	of	how	the	Gülen	movement	and	AKP	relations	evolved	from	a
strategic	alliance	in	the	early	2000s	toward	an	all-out-conflict	that	led	the	way	to	the	15	July	2016	coup	attempt.	Yet,
the	volume	overlooks	the	theoretical	literature	on	military	coups	around	the	world	and	fails	to	project	under	which
political,	economic	and	social	contexts	states	may	be	subject	to	military	interventions.	Military	coups	rarely	occur	in
liberal	democracies	and	free	societies.	Hence,	the	book	neither	really	addresses	under	what	conditions	this	coup
attempt	would	not	have	occurred	nor	how	Turkey	can	overcome	its	historical	pattern	of	military	interventions.
The	collection	also	largely	neglects	the	post-15	July	political	situation	in	Turkey,	where	thousands	of	academics,	civil
servants,	journalists,	students,	business	people	and	ordinary	citizens	have	lost	their	jobs	and	many	have	been
prosecuted	with	weak	due	process.	Thus,	the	book	does	not	attend	to	how	the	15	July	coup	attempt	and	the
democratic	defence	of	Turkish	people	have	not	brought	the	long-desired	consolidated	Turkish	democracy,	but	have
rather	led	to	a	persistent	state-of-emergency	politics	along	with	a	culturally	and	politically	divided	nation.	Turkey	now
is	governed	under	a	newly	adopted	presidential	system	(approved	as	a	result	of	the	16	April	2017	referendum),
and	Erdoğan	has	been	the	popularly	elected	first	president	under	this	new	system	following	the	24	June	2018
national	elections.	This	will	be	a	new	test	for	Turkish	politics	as	to	whether	the	era	of	military	interventions	is	now
bygone	and	the	long-desired	democratisation	can	ever	be	achieved.
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and	social	movements	within	the	context	of	Turkish	and	Kurdish	politics.	His	recent	publications	have	appeared	in
journals	such	as	Ethnopolitics,	Studies	in	Ethnicity	and	Nationalism,	Nationalities	Papers,	Globalizations,	Journal	of
International	Relations	and	Development	and	Journal	of	Balkan	and	Near	Eastern	Studies.		He	is	the	co-editor	of	a
recent	book	entitled	Comparative	Kurdish	Politics	in	the	Middle	East:	Actors,	Ideas,	and	Interests	(Palgrave,	2018).
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Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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